Yet, surprisingly, Pakistan army leadership has shown reluctance in conceding to US and NATO demands that the Afghan Taliban should be targetted as well. Instead it has chosen to carefully orchestrate a media ‘blitzkrieg’ for the western world with the twin objectives of showcasing the success stories and staking a claim for more aid and assistance.

On close observation, however, Pakistan establishment’s stance appears to be more convoluted than what is being portrayed, leaving several questions unanswered with regards to the military’s reasoning for not wanting to engage against the Afghan Taliban.       

CURRENT SCENE  

Pakistan’s Urdu press has maintained a guarded view with respect to military operations in the country’s north-west. Reports from the region are often dependent on ISPR statements, and talk predominately of military successes against Taliban militants. Given General Headquarters (GHQ) tight control over the media, reports are rarely critical of the army and are often accompanied by disclaimers stating that the war on terror has been thrust upon the country by Washington.

In addition, the Urdu media is quick to remind its audience that the eternal or primary enemy of the country remains India – with the war against the Taliban a secondary concern. By comparison, there are several instances of the western media on guided tours by the army, with the primary objective being to convey the military’s successes, whilst at the same time depicting a picture of under-development and poverty in the tribal belt. Given the sensitivity of operations in the region, media briefings or visits by the press can only occur with the government and military’s permission; put differently the areas showcased are carefully selected, and often highly sanitized. The tight control of the army over the flow of information from the region means that they have been able to successfully carry out a PR exercise targeted at the western audience, with a view to garner further monetary and logistical support.  

GROUND REALITY

This view is buttressed by a ground reality – inability of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return to their homes though the army maintains a large presence in the region. Put differently, the conditions are not conducive for a return to normal, the showcasing to the media notwithstanding.

It is no body’s case that Pakistan’s military doesn’t have the capability to take on the militants in their strongholds. It can indeed hold the militant bull by its horns, and comprehensively defeat the local Taliban. Yet, the Kayani army is resisting pressure. For two reasons. One the most obvious its own vested interest since the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban are considered as Army-ISI assets. Two it does not want to further antagonize a population, which has arguably been its harshest critic.

Frankly, these two reasons for inaction are no more than grandstanding since Pakistan is up against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and there is a realization that the TTP poses a legitimate threat what with regular strikes on major urban centres.  The people at large have come to view TTP as danger No. 1 to their safety and security. And gave the military a badly needed public endorsement to silence TTP.  

ARMY FAILURE
Any counter insurgency operation must ensure that civilian casualties remained at a minimum – Kayani army failed to adhere to this maxim is clear from the open apology tendered by the army chief recently in the face of hue and cry over civilian causalities. This is a set back, undoubtedly but it in no way undermines the fact that local Pakistanis ‘agreed’ to the war against their own people  though with much reluctance and it has opened up the possibility, albeit remote at present, of an endorsement of operations targeting the Afghan Taliban, who are traditionally seen as a friend of Pakistan.

Ops against Afghan Taliban certainly appear remote with Pakistan army maintaining that it will not focus on Afghan militants till the local Taliban are subdued. More over, like the general public, ranks of the establishment are also dead set such a plan. Given the historical linkages between the ISI and the Afghan Taliban, it is unlikely that Pakistan’s Intelligence Service and the Army will want to fight an ‘enemy’ which they have helped nurture and create.

Historically, the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani State have co-existed peacefully. Pakistan’s indigenous terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed trace their ideological and at times financial support to the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda. So, affiliation, affinity and the mutually beneficial relationship will deter the decision makers at GHQ from entering into a war which runs contrary to their interests.  
And put to a naught decades of trust and thrust to occupy a crest on the Durand Line.
   
FUTURE SCENARIO
Given that it is not in Pakistan’s interests to engage the Afghan Taliban, it is unlikely that Islamabad will meet Washington’s demands, more so
with less than a year left for the withdrawal of US and NATO troops. Pakistan is looking for long term strategic goals. With the West in a mood to talk to ‘Good Taliban’, Islamabad is factoring in the possibility of the Taliban having a stake in the governance of Afghanistan. Naturally therefore, Pakistan army will not want to carry out operations against the Afghan Taliban for fear of losing the goodwill they currently enjoy. With India viewed as the competitor in Afghanistan, Islamabad will want to ensure that any future dealings in and with Kabul place them ahead of New Delhi. Also, Pakistan will hold off US pressure to take on the Afghan Taliban. For as long as possible!