‘Recourse to nuclear weapons will be taken in response to the use against Russia or its allies of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction or in the event of aggression against Russia carried out with conventional weapons which nevertheless compromises its survival as a State.’, declares the new doctrine valid for the next 10 years.  .

Titled ‘Principles of the State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence until 2020’, the doctrine was unveiled by President Dmitry Medvedev on Feb 5. It is the third ‘revision’ of the country’s defence orientation since the break-up of Soviet Union.  

‘NATO’s expansion’ remains the ‘Number One’ threat, the doctrine says, and goes on to list ‘other potential’ areas of threats.

“Willingness to attach global functions to the military organisation of the NATO despite international law and to bring military infrastructure of its member states closer to the borders of Russia”, is identified as the main threat.  

Development of Ballistic Missile systems, militarization of outer space, deployment of strategic conventional weapons, and territorial claims on Russia and its allies as well as attempts to meddle in their domestic affairs are the other sources of potential threat.

Therefore, the New Russian Military Doctrine says the main tasks before the Armed Forces are defence of country’s sovereignty; its integrity and inviolability of territory; defence of citizens abroad from armed attacks; and fighting piracy.

FIRST-SECOND DOCTRINES
Russia adopted its first military doctrine in 1993 soon after the break up of Soviet Union.  It was quite defensive and ruled out “possibility of any armed conflicts”.  This posture was dictated by the Americans who had had overwhelming influence over President Yeltsin.  

The second doctrine was endorsed seven years later in the year 2000 as Russia heralded the Putin era. Generally the doctrine reflected ‘defensive in orientation’, as it declared Russia’s readiness to prevent wars by diplomatic methods and whatever other means that could be brought into play.  

Yet, it was categorical in saying ‘Russia retains the right to be the first to use nuclear weapons in the event of conventional weapons proved helpless against the aggression of foreign states like United States or military-political blocks like the NATO’.

The latest doctrine reflects further maturity, strength and confidence of Russia in its prowess.  The gradual evolutionary process of the military doctrine also exudes greater responsibility as the Feb 5 document avoided repeating ‘preventive’ nuclear strike “in critical situations”.  

A number of conditions are added for use of nuclear weapons while retaining the right to deliver a nuclear strike.  Russian authorities have clarified that nuclear ‘triad’ will continue to be developed and remained one of the higher priorities. The doctrine, however, used this in a less aggressive fashion than earlier (Year 2000).  The doctrine also stated that the decision on the use of nuclear weapons will be made by the President.

NATO UPSET
Russia’s new military doctrine invited strong disapproval from the NATO as expected.  

Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said the doctrine’s identification of NATO expansion as a threat did not reflect the ‘realities and it is a clear contradiction with all our endeavours to improve the relationship between NATO and Russia’.  

NATO’s efforts to deepen its engagement with Russia on Afghanistan have not been reciprocated, he complained.

On NATO’s request, Russia agreed to allow land transit of non-lethal NATO supplies to Afghanistan last year but there has not been much progress in using such a ‘Northern supply corridor’. NATO froze ties with Russia over latter’s intervention in Georgia in 2008 civil war and formal contacts were only resumed gradually

What has angered Russia is NATO’s expansion to include former Warsaw Pact States after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  

The prospects of eventual joining in the military alliance of Georgia and Ukraine has incensed Moscow as it would mean the NATO deployed directly on the borders of Russia.  

The ‘colour’ revolutions that the Bush administration had tried to push through Georgia, Ukraine and other former Soviet Republics were a real challenge to the Russian administrations headed by Putin and now Medvedev.  The proposals to deploy radars, ABMs in Czech Republic, Poland and lately in Romania have not done any good to address Russia’s security concerns.

The latest military doctrine reflects Moscow’s confidence in its ability to face these challenges.  The flip-side of US prompted colour revolutions and the way American allies stand discredited in Georgia and Ukraine contributed no less to the Russian mood.