The ground reality in Afghanistan may compel the US to continue its presence, even while insisting that it would keep the time table it has announced for withdrawal – or rather, beginning of the withdrawal from that trouble torn country.

Indeed, the commander of the US forces in Afghanistan, Gen. David Petraeus has himself said that the timetable of American troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan would be driven by situation on the ground. President Barack Obama has made clear to the four star general that he wants the best military advice possible concerning the drawdown of US forces in Afghanistan.  "Certainly, I am aware of the context within which I offer that advice," Petraeus told NBC. "But that just informs the advice; it doesn’t drive it. The situation on the ground drives it."

Obama has set July 2011 as a deadline to begin withdrawing troops. Petraeus is not acting alone and has the backing of the US Army. A report in The Daily Telegraph confirms this, saying that the US Army will ask Obama to slow down the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan as they need more time to complete the work there. Petraeus would tell Obama soon that the troops need more time to complete the work in the war-torn country.

The military has said it has only begun making breakthroughs in the past 12 months – despite the US mission in Afghanistan beginning in 2001

Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron both said that troops will begin leaving Afghanistan in July 2011 ahead of a total military pullout by 2015. The military is reportedly concerned over the plans in Afghanistan after fears were raised that the Iraq pullout was happening too quickly.

American troops will end combat operations in Iraq at the end of August. However, the chief of the Iraqi army has warned that the US army was needed in the country “for a decade more.” Petraeus earlier headed the US campaign in Iraq. Afghanistan president Hamid Karzai too has set 2014 as the deadline by which he would have the army and the police in place. Nobody seriously believes he can.

It is true that the US/NATO have “begun making breakthrough” in Afghanistan only in the last one year. But this far outweighs the spread of the Taliban and their allies that is both intensive and extensive.  The Taliban have taken control of much of the countryside and have shown the temerity to attack US’s bases, albeit without being able to enter them, in many cases. Also, they have marked their presence in the northern Afghanistan for the first time since 2001, staging operations north of Kabul, in places including Mazar-e-Sharif.  This has been possible because of the relentless help the Taliban get in Pakistani territory, but also from the Tehrik-e-Taliban, Pakistan.

Pakistan Army is fighting the TTP, but the US/NATO find their defences breached from both sides. This has required them to depend upon the drones. This is one area where the US/NATO has shown results.  As the role of drones in targeting terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan’s tribal areas bordering eastern Afghanistan increases, both in frequency and ferocity, ASM Ali Ashraf, a lecturer in international relations at Dhaka University, and currently doing his PhD at the University of Pittsburgh, the US, has debunked what he calls  “the three myths and three realities” about drone attacks.

The role of drones or unmanned aerial vehicles has increased significantly. Since the earliest reported drone strike in Pakistan in June 2004, the number of such strikes, their target areas, and total casualties from such strikes has increased significantly in 2008 and 2009.  International legal experts and human rights community have been extremely vocal in criticising the drone strikes, calling them an act of ‘extrajudicial killing’ and a blatant violation of international humanitarian law.

Importantly still, the drone strikes are reportedly carried out by America’s Central Intelligence Agency, which cannot claim the status of a legal combatant, making such strikes absolutely illegal, Ashraf has argued in Pakistan Journal of International Relations.

The drone strikes seem to have created three popular beliefs or ‘myths’:

   * Drone strikes are precision air-strikes. They can hit high-value targets or senior al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders who have found a safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Killing these leaders is essential for winning the war on terrorism.
   * Combat drones are effective weapons. They can selectively target terrorist leaders, while minimizing collateral damage or civilian casualties.
   * Drone strikes are unilateral actions, taken by the US. The US forces carry out the drone strikes without the consent or support of the Pakistani government.
Ashraf quotes available data and evidences to point to three alternative realities.

Reality 1: Drone strikes are not ‘precision’ air strikes.

Between June 2004 and December 2009, the US carried out nearly 100 drone strikes in Pakistan, which fired 230 missiles, and killed an estimated 1,250 people. Among those killed, only 37 were known high value targets or top terrorist leaders. This constitutes roughly 3 per cent of all casualties. The remaining 97 per cent casualties are non-high-value target — innocent civilians, and second- and third-tier terrorist leaders. None of the so-called high-value targets, except for TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud, was killed in US drone strike.

Reality 2: US drone strikes cannot guarantee zero civilian casualties.

There are several cases, in which US drone strikes killed innocent civilians, including children and women, and failed miserably in hitting the right target. For instance, on January 13, 2006, 18-25 people, mostly civilians, were killed in Bajaur Tribal Agency, in a series of drone strikes, apparently targeted to kill senior al-Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri. The following day nearly 8,000 tribesmen staged a protest against the air-strike (The Telegraph, January 15, 2006). In another drone strike on September 5, 2008, seven people, including four children, were killed in North Waziristan Agency (GeoTV, September 5, 2008).

Estimates of civilian casualties in drone strike vary sharply, with a range between 10 per cent and 98 per cent. According to military bloggers, Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, who appear to be supportive of the drone strategy, US drone strikes in Pakistan have a 10 per cent civilian casualty rate. By contrast, military analysts David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum, who are staunchly against the drone strategy, claim that US air-strikes are counterproductive as they have a record of 98 per cent civilian casualty, and only 2 per cent high-value targets casualty. A third estimate is offered by journalist Peter Bergen and his associate Katherine Tiedemann. They claim that drone strikes have a 30 per cent civilian casualty record.

Ashraf finds a 5 per cent confirmed cases of civilian deaths (63 civilian deaths out of 1,250 deaths) in US drone strikes in Pakistan during 2004-2009. Another 15 per cent civilian casualty can be reliably estimated based on the detailed observation of the data on targeted compounds and facilities hit by US drones. Thus, at least 20 per cent of all reported deaths (250 out of 1,250 deaths) in US drone strikes are civilian casualties.
In at least 12 cases (out of a total 119 known cases of targeted compounds or public gatherings), US drones fired missiles at madrassahs and two cases, when the drones fired missiles at janaza (funeral) prayers of militant suspects assassinated in earlier air-strikes. Although most accounts of US drone activity claim such targets as ‘militant targets,’ it is likely that not all madrassah students are actual or potential terrorists, and that not all funerals for militants are attended only by co-militants.

Reality 3: Pakistan offers tacit support in facilitating the drone strikes, albeit on a selective basis, targeting Pakistan-focused terrorist groups.

This runs counter to the popular belief that US drone strikes are unilateral military actions taken solely by the US military and the Central Intelligence Agency, operating in Afghanistan, and who are only capable of deploying the drones in Pak airspace. Two questions are pertinent here. Why tacit support? And, what is the level of cooperation between Pakistan and the US in carrying out the drone strikes?

Pakistani government’s tacit support is largely factored by Pakistan’s public opinion, which is deeply unfavourable to US drone strikes, as well as any potential foreign military intrusions into Pakistani airspace.  Although members of the Pakistani public perceive al-Qaeda and Taliban militants as a direct threat to their national security, most Pakistanis support a negotiated peace with the Taliban. Hence, perhaps a hostile public opinion and the fear of public embarrassment do not allow the Pakistani government to openly acknowledge the utility of drone attacks, despite the fact that some of the drones have directly benefited the Pakistani state by eliminating the ‘bad Taliban’ leaders such as Tehrek-e-Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud.

About the level of US-Pakistan cooperation, most experts suggest that Pakistan not only provides the US with actionable intelligence on possible Tehrek leaders, but also coordinates drone attacks on Tehrek targets. For Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership, US drone strikes against Tehrek leadership have several advantages.

First, it complements Pakistan’s ongoing counterinsurgency campaign in Waziristan, by leveraging on US air-strike capability. Second, although Pakistan possesses indigenous non-combat drones, it lacks the combat drone capability. Thus, support for US drone strikes against selected terrorists in Waziristan appears quite favourable to Pakistani national interest, and not an assault on Pakistani sovereignty.

Interestingly, although Pakistan appears to cooperate and coordinate with US drone strikes against Waziristan based Tehrek terrorists, and claims to be hostile towards al-Qaeda militants, it is less enthusiastic against the Afghanistan-focused militant groups (Taliban Central’s Quetta Shura, Haqqani network, and Hezb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin). This is due to the fact that Pakistan considers these three Afghan-focused groups as a potential ally in future Afghanistan. These groups are not perceived to be involved in terrorizing the Pakistani state, but are mostly focused on attacking US/NATO forces as well as Afghan national security forces in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s dual strategy — covert support for Afghan-focused terrorist groups, and a direct assault on the Pakistan-focused terrorist group (e.g. Tehrek-e-Taliban) lies in the fact that Pakistan considers the first groups as an instrument of foreign policy to counter Indian influence in Afghanistan; and the latter group as a direct threat to its national security, says Ashraf.

The drone strategy shows the limits of the international community in enforcing American compliance with international humanitarian law, codified in the Geneva Conventions, and aimed at protecting civilians in armed conflicts. For students of security studies, the drone strikes provide a test case for American hegemony, demonstrated by the sustained use of coercive airpower blended with surveillance technology in fighting international terrorism.