China has established its villages within the Bhutanese territory. That must be a first even for the Chinese. Not actually! They are now upto the same mischief with India.

Bhutan has over 400km long border with China. Both countries have signed an MoU to expedite boundary negotiations. And finalised a three-step roadmap during the 10th Expert Group meeting held in Kunming in April 2021.

The roadmap is China’s way of getting Bhutan to accept the changed ground situation by the construction of its settlements within Bhutanese territory, which, in areas like Doklam, present a clear danger to India’s security.

A twitter user who uses the handle @detresfa, has posted satellite imagery that clearly shows that China has built at least four villages nearly three to four kilometres deep inside the disputed territory along the border with Bhutan.

These villages are in an area of about 100 sq.km that is under Chinese occupation and located at a short distance from Doklam. Also visible in the satellite pictures are several rows of houses and new roads at all the four villages, all located in mountainous terrain. Two of these villages are fairly large.

Since 1984, talks between Bhutan and China have largely focused on two separate areas of dispute, including Doklam and other areas in Western Bhutan, near the Bhutan-China-India tri-junction, measuring 269 square kms. In the North Bhutan, the dispute is in the areas of Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys located near Tibet, which measure 495 sq. km. On 5 July 2020, China stated that it has a border dispute with Bhutan in the eastern region, and laid claim to Sakteng.

China was developing a village near Doklam, South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported on Dec 6, 2020. (Doklam  is where Indian and Chinese troops had a long stand-off in 2017). The reference is Pangda, on the west bank of the Torsa River. This village is said to be 2.5km (1.5 miles) inside the Bhutanese border.

China claims that Pangda is in Yadong county of Tibet Autonomous Region, (TAR), which is just 9 km from the Doklam Plateau. Pangda as seen in recent satellite pictures and from China’s own official statements is one of the 628 moderately well-off villages, or what the Chinese term as Xiaokang.  

China is in the process of constructing such villages all along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), at the behest of President Xi Jinping, with the aim of “stabilising Tibet for the governance of frontier regions”.

In October 2015, China established one of its earliest Xiaokangs inside Bhutan. It came up at Gyalaphug. The village was visited by Wu Yinjie, the then CPC Party Secretary for TAR.

At that time, little did the world know that this Xiaokang had been built inside Bhutan. It was a 232-square-mile area claimed by China since the early 1980s but internationally understood as part of Lhuntse district in Northern Bhutan. (Foreign Policy, 7 May 2021).

Since then, China has progressed with the construction of Xiaokang villages right across the Himalayas. With Bhutan and China having signed a new Roadmap MoU to finalise the boundary question, there is the possibility of an “exchange” of disputed territories involving the Doklam tri-junction area.

Earlier negotiations covered territories in Northern Bhutan and Western Bhutan including Pasamlung and Jakarlung valleys in the North and Doklam to the West.  

China may offer a package solution that would see Beijing ceding the northern valleys but controlling Doklam. As pointed out at the outset, the Chinese have extended their dispute with Bhutan to Sakteng. This is no more than a negotiating tactic to bring Bhutan back to the table.

Since the 2017 stand-off with India, China has strengthened its de-facto control over much of the Doklam plateau, located strategically to the north of the Bhutan-China-India tri-junction.

Apart from the face-off site (where India had objected to a road being built aimed at pushing the tri-junction point further south), China has deepened its presence on most parts of the plateau. And faced little opposition from Bhutan!

One possible reason for China’s behaviour is that creating disputes in its neighbourhood helps it ease insecurities arising out of increasing public dissent at home.  China is battling failing incomes, rising unemployment, and other socio-economic challenges.

Like in the past, today also, China finds solace in creating disputes with its neighbours rather than resolving problems at home.

There is another strategic rationale for Chinese actions in Bhutan that is far more pertinent. This has been aptly summed up by Robin Barnett, a noted scholar on Modern Tibet.

“China’s aim is to force the Bhutanese government to cede territory that it wants elsewhere in Bhutan to give Beijing a military advantage in its struggle with New Delhi”, he wrote in Foreign Policy eight months ago, on the 7^th of May 2021.  

Therein lies the reality of the Xiaokang villages being built by China in Bhutanese territory. Rand the reality of security threat to India particularly along the LAC in the Eastern Theatre that includes Arunachal Pradesh and the Siliguri Corridor also known as the Chicken’s neck. 

Eternal vigil is the order of the day besides, of course, a readiness to protect, preserve, and further Indian national interests on Indian terms.  (POREG)