Magda Lipan*

Until recently, Pakistan and China have enjoyed cordial relations and the Chinese government has remained quite popular with the Pakistanis. Islamabad especially, has touted these ties between the ‘Iron Brothers’. There are, however, indications that this benign perception in the minds of the Pakistani people is shifting quite rapidly. Particularly so in the less developed regions of the country such as Balochistan, sentiment has rapidly turned against China as the promised benefits of Chinese investment failed to materialize.

For instance, in the port city of Gwadar, the focal point for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), there have been persistent mass protests against privileges being granted to the Chinese. The local community has been severely impacted by illegal fishing carried out with aplomb by Chinese trawlers, drastically affecting the livelihood of the native fishermen.

To compound their woes, the region has witnessed dramatic food and electricity shortages as well. Adding insult to injury, the construction of various security check-points and fences to improve security for the Chinese projects and Chinese work force, has also been a cause of anguish for the local community.

Not only have these restrictive physical security measures greatly inconvenienced the locals and curtailed their ability to move between their houses and places of work, but the overall changes in the region’s landscape and the attendant land use   brought about by the Pakistani Government, have also given rise to intense feelings amongst the locals of being caged in.

The brewing resentment has entrenched a perception that everything has been done for the benefit of the Iron Brother and the privileged amongst the Pak elite, while the common man has been deprived of the fruits of this ‘development’ programme; his land and resources unjustly expropriated, and he has been reduced to a bystander at best, and a prisoner at worst.

The seething anger of the local community stems from a feeling of betrayal, as they had been promised an improved standard of living, health care through a network of hospitals, and an end to the perennial electricity and water shortages plaguing them. Instead, the benefits of China’s investment have accrued mainly to Chinese firms and workers.

The Pakistani Government, when sanctioning these projects, had naively harboured the hope that they would lead to better integration of Balochistan with the rest of the country. That has not come to pass. On the contrary, the economic failure of these projects has saddled Pakistan with humungous debts that it cannot possibly hope to service, while simultaneously creating a backlash amongst the affected communities.

The locals are now disinclined to believe in their government’s promises and have also developed a deep hostility towards the Chinese as well as the Pakistani Government which they see as complicit in the exploitation of their resources by foreigners.

Constant news of Chinese oppression of its Muslim minority Uyghurs and their plight, and the disrespect thus shown by Beijing for Islam, has hammered China’s image in the deeply pious and conservative Balochistan. This situation has become a headache for Pakistan, which in any event, has for years squared off against a tenacious group of Baloch secessionist rebels.

Much ink has been spilt elsewhere about China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the financial problems that are often visited upon regions where its infrastructure investments are concentrated, Sri Lanka’s current anarchy being the prime case in point.

In the case of Pakistan, this discontent has often bubbled into a support for various religious extremist factions who are viewed by disaffected local populations as being honest and having their best interests at heart, in contradistinction with a small clique of Pakistani military and political figures who have been bartering the country’s resources to Beijing for personal enrichment.

The extensive security apparatus in Balochistan and other CPEC areas has been both cause as well as reaction to this extremism, with numerous suicide bombings and other attacks targeting Chinese nationals and projects. A poignant reminder of the hostility felt towards the Chinese was the abhorrent prohibition imposed on Pakistani workers wanting to offer namaz during working hours.

The financial implications of the CPEC have been immense; at $62 billion the amount approaches 20% of the Pakistani GDP and due to repeated setbacks, allegations of corruption and findings of over-charging from Pakistani committees, the entire project has been slimmed down, and Pakistan with its economic woes has been renegotiating the debt.

It is in this context that the unrest and disappointments in Gwadar are so alarming, as despite the deep ties between China and Pakistan, the mutual suspicion and particularly the scepticism felt within Pakistan’s own population will act as a barrier to the success of this sort of massive collaboration. The opacity of the financial terms of these undertakings, which is a hallmark of all BRI projects globally, has only added to the misgivings in Pakistan.

For its part, Beijing now begrudgingly accepts that its investments in Pakistan face a serious threat on account of the Islamic militant radicalism, particularly the insurgency in Balochistan.

The future for Gwadar seems unclear, since the strategic value of the location is questionable at best, given the obvious advantages of its competitor – the neighbouring Chabahar Port in Iran, which can easily cater to Central Asia and Afghanistan in addition to Iran, while negotiating relatively much easier terrain.

Economic logic aside, the utter failure of both Pakistan and China to share the benefits of development with local communities leaves the fate of Gwadar and CPEC highly uncertain.

The dreams of bustling economic activity at a developed and safe Gwadar, being the lynchpin of maritime access for Central Asia to the Arabian Sea, have quickly receded into the background, while Islamabad is left pondering the massive debts that this white elephant has bequeathed, as well as the avoidable popular backlash and erosion of Pakistani state authority in the region. (POREG)

**The writer is a regular contributor.